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On the Use of Statistics in Employment
Discrimination Cases
RICHARD M. COHN*
The use of quantitative information in employment discrimina-
tion cases has become increasingly common.' Differences in rates
of hiring, promotion, demotion or dismissal between minority and
majority groups are used to develop a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. Evidence of this type is deemed to represent the outcome
of employers' discriminatory practices, including practices the
description of which does not indicate any overt discriminatory in-
tent.2 This reliance on quantitative information undoubtedly will
increase since the new Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures (1978) (U.G.E.S.P.) specifically define evidence of dis-
crimination in quantitative terms.'
As a result of this increased emphasis on quantitative informa-
tion, it is necessary that litigants in discrimination cases, including
governmental agencies, become intelligent consumers of such'infor-
mation. Contrary to popular opinion, numbers rarely speak for
themselves. Both interpretation and evaluation are required of all
but the most elementary quantitative descriptions and analyses. As
evidence of this, this article discusses three issues concerning the
potential misuse of quantitative information in employment dis-
crimination cases. Each issue illustrates a basic property of quanti-
tative information which affects its probative value. First, the basic
issue of when statistical inference is appropriate is considered. To
* A.B. 1970, M.A. 1975, Ph. D. 1977, University of Michigan. Member of the Department
of Sociology, and the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-
Madison.
' For reviews of the use of quantitative evidence in employment discrimination cases, see
Holley & Feild, Using Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 43 (1978); Joseph, Evidence: Statistical Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 28
OKLA. L. REV. 885 (1975); Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws
Against Discrimination, 22 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 259 (1973).
1 As an example of the acceptance of quantitative evidence of discrimination where the
description of an employer's hiring policy does not indicate any overt discriminatory prac-
tice, see Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
1 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.G.E.S.P.]. Section 3A of the
U.G.E.S.P. states: "Procedure having adverse impact constitutes discrimination unless justi-
fied." Id. at 38,297. Section 4D defines adverse impact as "[a] selection rate for any race,
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the
group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of adverse impact." Id. Section 16R defines selection rate as "[t]he proportion of
applicants or candidates who are hired, promoted, or otherwise selected." Id. at 38,308.
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illustrate the confusion concerning this issue, a recently published
application of an elementary statistical test to employment selec-
tion procedures is critically reviewed. The second issue considered
is the inappropriate use of particular quantitative measures as evi-
dence of discrimination. Illustrative of this is the new U.G.E.S.P.
strategy for determining "prosecutorial discretion" in employment
discrimination cases. A simple quantitative model of an employer's
hiring rate is developed to indicate the problematic aspects of the
U.G.E.S.P. strategy. The final issue discussed is how quantitative
analysis may be used to distinguish when a characteristic, such as
sex or age, is a "bona fide occupational qualification" from when it
is the basis of discrimination.
THE INAPPROPRIATE USE OF STATISTICS AND STATISTICAL
INFERENCE
An important misuse of quantitative information in employment
discrimination cases may result from the failure to distinguish
when such information is a "statistic" as opposed to a "parame-
ter." A statistic is quantitative information which is calculated
from sample data. It is used to estimate the corresponding value
for the entire population. This value for the population is the pa-
rameter. The estimation of the parameter from the statistic is an
inferential process. Statistical inference is a probability statement;
a statement that a known value of a sample statistic equals the
(unmeasured) population parameter with a certain probability. For
example, if the results of a sample survey are statistics which indi-
cate women earn less than men, it can be inferred, with a given
level of certainty, that in the entire population women, on average,
earn less than men. That women actually do earn less than men in
the entire population can never be known with complete certainty,
i.e., the probability of the truth of the statement is less than 1.0,
unless a complete census is carried out.
For a statistic to be an accurate estimate of a parameter, the
sample on which the statistic is based must have certain proper-
ties. The most important properties are that individuals in the
population have a fixed, known and nonzero probability of being
included in the sample, and that the sample is representative of
the population.4 When these properties are absent, the use of a
Typically these properties of a sample are insured by some form of random selection
process. Although sampling procedures can be considerably more complicated, the classic
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statistic to infer the value of the parameter is inappropriate.
When using any quantitative information, two basic characteris-
tics of the information must be known. First, it is necessary to
know if the information is truly statistical, i.e., calculated from a
sample, or if the information is calculated from a complete count
(census) of some population. For example, information on male
and female promotion rates in a company are parameter values for
that company and cannot be viewed as statistics to infer differ-
ences in promotion rates for all companies. The specific company's
promotion rate information does not constitute a statistic for a
sample of companies because the probability of any other com-
pany's promotion rates being included as data is zero. Given the
information about one company's promotion rates, it is not possi-
ble to infer differences in the industry or any other aggregate. The
company's promotion rate is a parameter value for that company,
known with complete certainty. The information is not a statistic
which can be used to estimate the parameter value for any other
aggregate with any known certainty.
The second property of any quantitative information which must
be known is the definition of the population to which the informa-
tion applies. In the above example, the population is defined as the
employees of the specific company. In situations where the infor-
mation is truly statistical, the population to which statistical infer-
ences can be made must be precisely defined. For example, if the
sample was selected to include only labor force participants, then
the population to which inferences can be made is the population
of labor force participants, not the total population in a certain
geographic area. It is inappropriate to use statistics calculated
from this sample to infer parameter values to any population
larger or smaller than the population of labor force participants.
An example of the confusion which can result from the failure to
determine whether quantitative information is a statistic or a pa-
rameter is a recent Harvard Law Review article which describes an
elementary statistical test purported to be useful in indicating the
adverse impact of employment testing.5 In the article, the author,
example of drawing names from a hat to produce a sample is instructive. Having each indi-
vidual's name appear on only one slip insures that each member of the population will have
a fixed, known, and nonzero probability of being selected (in this case each member has an
equal chance of selection). Thoroughly stirring the names and selecting them blindly insures
that the sample will be representative of the population. Details on the necessary properties
of a sample and descriptions of sampling techniques can be found in most elementary statis-
tics texts and research methods texts. See, e.g., L. KIsH, SURVEY SAMPLING (1965).
' Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under
1980]
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Professor Elaine Shoben, proposes that the difference in passing
rates on an employment selection test between minority and ma-
jority applicants be considered a statistic and used to estimate
whether the test has an adverse impact in the population.6 This
proposed use of the difference in passing rates information for a
specific employer as a statistic is contrasted with the U.G.E.S.P.'s
"4/5ths rule" to indicate adverse impact of the employment test.
With the guideline rule, a difference of twenty percent or more in
the proportion passing the test between minority and majority ap-
plicants is viewed as indicating adverse impact.
The Shoben article argues that the proposed statistical test is
superior to the use of the "4/5ths rule" which is not liable to statis-
tical inference. While the U.G.E.S.P. indicate that the "4/5ths
rule" is to be used in lieu of statistical tests, the guidelines are
vague as to when, if ever, the "4/5ths rule" is to be applied. As
noted in section 4D of the U.G.E.S.P., a statistically significant dif-
ference in passing rates smaller than 0.2 may be used as evidence
of adverse impact when there is a large number of applicants. In
cases where there is a small number of applicants, a difference in
passing rates greater than 0.2 may not be used to indicate adverse
impact if the difference is not statistically significant.' Thus, the
number of applicants an employer processes may determine
whether or not adverse impact of the selection procedures is indi-
cated, regardless of the true discriminatory nature of the test, be-
Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978). Adverse impact, as used in the Shoben article and
defined in § 16B of the U.G.E.S.P., is "[a] substantially different rate of selection ii, hiring,
promotion, or other employment decision which works to the disadvantage of members of a
race, sex, or ethnic group." 43 Fed. Reg. 38,307 (1978).
6 The Shoben article suggests the use of the difference in proportions test, where the
observed difference in proportions passing the test between minority and majority appli-
cants of an employer is used to estimate whether for the entire population there exists a
difference in passing rates. For a description of the test, see Shoben, supra note 5, at 797-
805, or any elementary statistics text.
7 See note 3 supra.
8 Section 4D of the U.G.E.S.P. states:
Smaller differences [than 0.2] in selection rate may nevertheless constitute ad-
verse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms
or where the user's actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on
grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate may
not constitute adverse impact where the differences are based on small num-
bers and are not statistically significant . ...
43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978). See also Questions and Answers 22 & 24, interpreting and clari-
fying the U.G.E.S.P. 44 Fed. Reg. 11,999 (1979). As the federal enforcement agency has
discretion in choosing whether a test of statistical significance or the "4/5ths rule" is used to
indicate adverse impact, considerable uncertainty among employers as to when they are in
violation of the U.G.E.S.P. can be expected.
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cause alternate decision rules may be applied to the quantitative
information.
Any statistical test, the one proposed in the Shoben article or
the test proposed as an alternative to the "4/5ths rule" in the
U.G.E.S.P., is inappropriate to indicate adverse impact. The em-
ployer's quantitative information on passing rates is not a statistic,
but rather a population parameter. As such, the use of any test of
statistical significance of the differences in passing rates to infer to
a population larger than that of the individuals who took the test
is inappropriate. In the Shoben article it is argued that the test-
takers can be considered a sample of all potential job applicants in
the employer's "labor pool," i.e., they are a sample of a population
defined as the potential job applicants of the employer. In fact, the
applicants who took the test are not a sample of anything, for
there is no fixed or known probability by which all potential appli-
cants become test-takers, i.e., become part of the sample. Those
individuals who took the test define the population of test-takers.
No statistical inference relating a difference in their observed pass-
ing rates to an unmeasured difference in passing rates in a larger
population is warranted.'
A similar argument applies to the U.G.E.S.P.'s suggested use of
statistical tests as an alternative to the "4/5ths rule" in determin-
ing adverse impact. The information of the employer's passing
rates is not sample information, it is a population parameter.1 °
There is no appropriate use of a test of statistical significance with
this information because there is no larger population to which to
infer. Regardless of the number of applicants taking the test, the
difference in passing rates between minority and majority appli-
cants has the same value in indicating adverse impact.11 As an al-
9 Shoben, supra note 5, at 801, notes that as a "sample," the actual test-takers may not
be representative of the "population" of all potential test-takers. This is likely true, but it is
irrelevant given that the test-takers do not constitute a sample in the first place.
1o The definition of the population need not be limited to only those applicants taking the
test at a single administration. The population may be defined as all the applicants taking
the test during a specific year. For purposes of evaluating adverse impact of the test, a
change in the contents of the test would require a new population of applicants be defined.
11 With statistical information, the certainty with which one can infer that the sample
statistic equals the population parameter increases with the size of the sample. Thus, when
quantitative information is truly statistical, its acceptance by the court or governmental
enforcement agency may be questioned if the sample size is deemed inadequate. Quantita-
tive information which is calculated from an entire population cannot be disputed on the
basis of the number of observations. Thus, in the above example of the difference in passing
rates to indicate adverse impact, because the information is a population parameter, the
number of observations (test-takers) is irrelevant t6 the question of adverse impact. The
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ternative to the "4/5ths rule," the use of a test of the statistical
significance of the difference in passing rates is inappropriate. 2
The level of statistical significance indicates the certainty with
which a difference in passing rates observed in a sample can be
inferred to exist in a population.'8 Statistical significance is mean-
ingless when not referring to the relation of a sample value (statis-
tic) to a population value (parameter). The failure to note that the
information obtained from an employer is not sample information
can produce erroneous uses of quantitative information such as
found in the Shoben article and section 4D of the U.G.E.S.P.
The determination of whether the information is derived from a
sample is relevant to the quality of the evidence indicating dis-
crimination. If the information on the test-takers' performance is
erroneously conceptualized as being sample data from a population
of all potential test-takers, the test of statistical significance ad-
dresses the question: "Is it likely there would be such a difference
in observed test scores if the test has no adverse impact in the
entire population?" Not only are the observed scores inadequate
evidence to answer this question when they are viewed as sample
results, due to the unknown bias of the "sample," but this question
is not the legal question at issue. The question at issue is whether
census of Liechtenstein is as informative as the census of China.
However, there is a reason for requiring a minimum number of test-takers in the popula-
tion which is unrelated to the issue of statistical significance. Since several factors, other
than race, may determine test performance, in comparing the passing rates of minority and
majority applicants, it is important to control for racial differences in these nonracial fac-
tors, e.g., education, experience. If there are racial differences in these factors, there should
be an adequate number of observations of minority and majority group applicants with sim-
ilar qualifications to allow for racial comparisons when these qualifications are held con-
stant. The importance of controlling for racial differences in job qualifications when evaluat-
ing racial differences in hiring is discussed later in this article. See notes 25-38 &
accompanying text infra. A
12 Rather than not applying the "4/5ths rule" because it is too "stringent" for employers
with few applicants and too "lenient" for employers with many applicants, an alternative
form of the rule might be used. If federal enforcement agencies consider it appropriate to
include the number of applicants, as well as the difference in selection rates, in determining
adverse impact, a graduated "rule" of the difference in selection rates is appropriate. The
graduated structure of the rule could be progressive, similar to the structure of the income
tax rate. Thus, the larger the number of applicants processed by an employer, the smaller
the difference in selection rates necessary to indicate adverse impact.
13 Actually, the common manner by which the level of statistical significance is stated
denotes the degree of certainty of no difference not existing in the population. Thus, the
0.05 level of significance indicates a certainty of 1 out of 20 that no difference in selection
rates does not exist in the population. The reason for the double negative is that statistical
tests are formulated as a rejection of a (null) hypothesis which is counter to the actual
hypothesis of interest.
[Vol. 55:493
USE OF STATISTICS
or not the company's test has produced a differential passing rate
between groups. This question is nonprobabilistic, has no reference
to test-takers at any other point in time, and is unequivocally an-
swered by treating the quantitative information as population
data.
DEFINING DISCRIMINATION WITH AN INAPPROPRIATE MEASURE
The second misuse of quantitative information in employment
discrimination cases is the inappropriate choice of a particular
measure as evidence of discrimination. Various ratios have been
used to indicate disproportionate hiring or employment of minor-
ity group members. Perhaps the most commonly used parameter is
the ratio of the proportion of hires (H) in the population or labor
pool (L) between minority and majority groups, i.e., [(H/L)blacks/
(H/L)whites]. A value of this ratio of less than one has been used
as evidence of discrimination.1'
The use of this ratio as evidence of an employer's discriminatory
practices can be misleading. The proportion hired for a particular
group can be decomposed as the product of several proportions:
(H/L) = (HIS) (SIQ) (Q/A) (AlL)
where:
L-number of group members in the labor pool
A=number of applicants
Q=number of applicants who are qualified for the job
S=number of qualified applicants who pass the employer's se-
lectibn procedures
H-number who are hired.
Ratios of each of these proportions for minority and majority
groups can be indicated as
[(H/L)blacks/(H/L)whites] - [(H/S)blacks/(H/S)whites] [(SI
Q)blacks/(S/Q)whites] [(Q/A)blacks/(Q/A)whites] [(A/L)blacks/(A/
14 See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Ochoa v.
Monsanto Co., 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). In the above cases, the
total population, rather than the size of the relevant labor pool, was used to indicate L. The
inappropriateness of using the total population instead of a measure of the size of the labor
pool is noted in Hazelwood School- Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13, 310-12
(1977).
To be consistent with the form of the measure used in court cases and the U.G.E.S.P., H
represents the number of individuals who are hired by the company. A more precise indica-
tor of an employer's discriminatory practices would be obtained if H stood for the number
of individuals who are offered employment, regardless of whether they accept the offer.
1980]
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L)whites].
The ratio of the proportions (A/L) indicates the difference between
minority and majority groups in their application for the job. The
ratio of the (A/L) proportions can be assumed to be only partially
influenced by the employer's recruitment efforts. A series of other
factors, including alternative job opportunities in the labor market,
may differentially determine the proportion (A/L), and conse-
quently (H/L), for minority and majority groups. Thus the use of
the ratio of the proportions (H/L) to indicate the employer's dis-
criminatory practices, without also indicating the proportions (A/
L), can be misleading.15
Perhaps recognizing the fallibility of this measure, the
U.G.E.S.P. indicate that the appropriate indicator of discrimina-
tory practice is not the ratio of the hiring proportions (H/L), but
the ratio of the "selection rates."' 6 Using the notation described
above, the selection rate may be indicated as (H/A) and decom-
posed as (H/A) = (H/S)(S/Q)(Q/A).1 7
The rate at which minority applicants are selected, i.e., (H/
A)blacks, is compared to the rate for majority group applicants,
(H/A)whites. If the ratio of these rates is less than 0.8 the "4/5ths
rule" is violated and adverse impact of the employer's selection
procedures is indicated. While the selection rate (H/A) is a more
accurate measure of the employer's discriminatory practices than
the hiring rate (H/L), it too can be misleading. To show this, the
determinants of the selection rate's components must be
considered.
The proportion of applicants truly qualified for the job, (Q/A), is
generally unknown to the employer.' 8 The employer has little or no
control over this proportion. There is no reason to assume that the
proportion (Q/A) is the same for minority and majority groups.
Due to unequal opportunities for schooling, job training programs,
accumulation of relevant job experience, and other factors, it is
possible that the minority group has a lower (Q/A) proportion than
5 The misleading nature of using the ratio of proportions (H/L) without also reporting
the ratio of the proportions (A/L) has been noted by the courts. See Richardson v. Indiana
Bell Tel. Co., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 797 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
le See note 3 supra, for the U.G.E.S.P. definition of "selection rate."
17 For definitions of what constitutes an "applicant" and a "candidate," see Question and
Answer 15, interpreting the U.G.E.S.P. 44 Fed. Reg. 11,998 (1979).
"8 Unless an analysis of the job produces a definitive list of the qualifications for the
particular job and these qualifications are characteristics of applicants which are vested in
the applicants, rather than acquired after employment, the rate (Q/A) can never be known
with certainty.
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the majority group. Conversely, it is equally possible that because
of other employers refusing to hire qualified minority workers,
there is a surplus of qualified minority applicants for a specific em-
ployer and therefore the (Q/A) proportion of the minority group is
greater than the (Q/A) proportion of the majority group.
The proportion of qualified applicants who pass the employer's,
selection procedures, (S/Q), can be assumed to be equal for minor-
ity and majority groups if the procedures are fairly administered
and actually measure the qualifications for the job. 19 Since the
number of qualified applicants, Q, is unknown, the ratio of the (SI
Q) proportions of the groups can never be calculated directly. Yet
it is a reasonable assumption, given fair and relevant selection pro-
cedures, that minority and majority applicants of equal qualifica-
tions will pass the selection procedures at the same rate.
The proportion of those successfully completing the selection
procedures who are hired, (H/S), is completely determined by the
employer. This proportion is a known, directly observable quanti-
ty. Any difference in the proportion between minority and majority
groups, i.e., a ratio of proportions not equal to one, can be viewed
as evidence of discrimination.20
In evaluating the adverse impact of an employer's selection pro-
cedures and determining "prosecutorial discretion," the U.G.E.S.P.
indicate a "bottom line" strategy will be used.21 This.strategy con-
,9 A perfectly accurate selection procedure would completely distinguish qualified from
unqualified applicants and thus (S/Q) would be equal to 1.0. The requirements for valida-
tion of selection procedures described in the U.G.E.S.P. do not require such a stringent level
of validation. As indicated in § 5B of the U.G.E.S.P., "[e]vidence of the validity of a test or
other selection procedure by a criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical
data demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of job performance." 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978). Thus, the propor-
tion (S/Q) may be considerably lower than 1.0. Part of the requirement for selection proce-
dure validation includes producing evidence of "fairness," i.e., the selection procedure does
not differentially indicate qualification for the job between minority and majority appli-
cants. See § 14B8 U.G.E.S.P., 43 Fed. Reg. 38,299 (1978). This part of the validation process
is to insure that (S/Q)blacks equals (S/Q)whites.
20 A ratio of the proportions (H/S) greater than 1.0, i.e., [(H/S)blacks/(H/S)whites] >1.0,
indicates "affirmative action" on the part of the employer.
22 Section 4C of the U.G.E.S.P. states, in part,
The 'bottom line.' If the information called for by sections 4A and B above
shows that the total selection process for a job has an adverse impact, the indi-
vidual components of the selection process should be evaluated for adverse im-
pact. If this information shows that the total selection process does not have an
adverse impact, the Federal enforcement agencies, in the exercise of their ad-
ministrative and prosecutorial discretion, in usual circumstances, will not ex-
pect a user to evaluate the individual components for adverse impact, or to
validate such individual components, and will not take enforcement action
1980]
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sists of examining the ratio of the selection rates for minority and
majority groups [(H/A)blacks/(H/A)whites]. If this ratio is greater
than 0.8, i.e., if the "4/5ths rule" is not violated, the U.G.E.S.P.
indicate that the individual components of the selection procedure
will not be evaluated for adverse impact and enforcement action is
not likely. 22
The use of this "bottom line" strategy can lead either to the
false charge of adverse impact or to the conclusion that no adverse
impact exists when, in fact, the employer's selection procedure is
discriminatory. These results are possible because of the misuse of
the quantitative information of selection rates (H/A) to indicate
adverse impact. This problematic feature of the "bottom line"
strategy may be illustrated by two examples. The cases of two hy-
pothetical employers are described in Table I.
based upon adverse impact of any component of that process, including the
separate parts of a multipart selection procedure or any separate procedure
that is used as an alternative method of selection.
43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978).
22 Exceptions to the use of the "bottom line" strategy are noted in § 4C of the U.G.E.S.P.
The relevant part of the section states:
However, in the following circumstances the Federal enforcement agencies will
expect a user to evaluate the individual components for adverse impact and
may, where appropriate, take enforcement action with respect to the individual
components: (1) where the selection procedure is a significant factor in the
continuation of patterns of assignments of incumbent employees caused by
prior discriminatory employment practices, (2) where the weight of court deci-
sions or administrative interpretations hold that a specific procedure (such as
height or weight requirements or no-arrest records) is not job related in the
same or similar circumstances. In unusual circumstances, other than those
listed in (1) and (2) above, the Federal enforcement agencies may request a
user to evaluate the individual components for adverse impact and may, where
appropriate, take enforcement action with respect to the individual
component.
Id. Neither of these exceptions is relevant to the critique of the "bottom line" strategy de-
scribed herein.
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TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF ERRONEOUS EVALUATIONS OF ADVERSE IMPACT
USING THE U.G.E.S.P. "BOTTOM LINE" STRATEGY
Case 1: Case 2:
False Charge of Adverse Impact Failure to Discover Adverse Impact
Whites Blacks Ratio Whites Blacks Ratio
(Blacks/Whites) (Blacks/Whites)
A 1000 200 1000 200
Q 900 120 600 180
S 630 84 600 180
H 567 84 600 108
Q]A 0.90 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.90 1.50
S/Q 0.70 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
H/S 0.90 1.00 1.11 1.00 0.60 0.60
H/A 0.57 0.42 0.74 0.60 0.54 0.90
H/Q 0.63 0.70 1.11 1.00 0.60 0.60
where:
A = number of applicants
Q = number of applicants qualified for the job
S = number of applicants who successfully pass employer's selection procedures
H = number of applicants who are hired
H/A = "selection rate"
In Case 1, the employer would be falsely charged with an ad-
verse impact of his selection procedures because the ratio of the
selection rates (reported in the third column of the Table) is less
than 0.8. Yet qualified blacks are passing the employer's selection
procedures at the same rate as qualified white applicants and the
employer is hiring selected black applicants at a rate greater than
selected white applicants, i.e., the employer has a program of af-
firmative action. The false charge of adverse impact of the selec-
tion procedures results from the proportion of black applicants
who are qualified for the job being only two-thirds that of the pro-
portion of white applicants.
In litigation of the charge of adverse impact, the employer in
Case 1 could point to the following facts to support his case:
1. the affirmative action evident by the ratio [(H/S)blacks/
(H/S)whites] equaling 1.11;
19801
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2. qualitative evidence of fair administration of the selection
procedures to infer (S/Q)blacks equals (S/Q)whites.
Whether the qualitative evidence of the second fact can be success-
ful in countering the quantitative evidence that [(S/A)blacks/(S/
A)whites] equals 0.67 (a violation of the "4/5ths rule") is not dis-
cussed in the U.G.E.S.P.
In Case 2, the employer is not charged with adverse impact
under the "bottom line" strategy because the ratio of selection
rates is greater than 0.8. Yet the employer is hiring blacks who
have successfully passed the employment selection procedures at a
rate only sixty percent, that of whites. The failure of the "bottom
line" strategy to discover this discriminatory practice is a result of
the proportion of black applicants who are qualified for the job
being fifty percent greater than the proportion of white
applicants.23
The basic flaw of the U.G.E.S.P.'s "bottom line" strategy is that
it uses too highly aggregated quantitative information to indicate
discrimination. The strategy's reliance on the ratio of the selection
rates (H/A) to indicate an employer's discriminatory practices is
based on the assumption that the ratio of the (Q/A) proportions is
1.0. This is always an untested and questionable assumption. The
most accurate single measure of the discriminatory nature of the
employer's hiring process, the ratio of the proportion of qualified
applicants who are hired, (H/Q), is not directly observable. Thus,
to accurately detect and evaluate the adverse impact of the em-
ployer's selection process requires the use of both disaggregated
measures of the selection process, e.g., (H/S), and direct qualitative
analyses of the procedures used in the process. 24
ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES TO DETECT DISCRIMINATION
The third issue in the use of quantitative information in employ-
ment discrimination cases concerns how the information is prop-
erly analyzed to indicate discrimination. When quantitative infor-
mation indicates differential treatment by an employer of
23 The exceptions to the use of the "bottom line" strategy, see note 22 supra, would not
make the employer in Case 2 subject to evaluation of the components of his selection pro-
cess. Thus the employer's discriminatory practice of hiring blacks who have passed the se-
lection procedures at a lower rate than whites would go undetected.
24 To simplify the illustration, the hiring model described above includes only one term to
indicate selection testing (S/Q). The model can easily be expanded to include separate terms
for each stage of the selection process, e.g., interviews, paper and pencil tests.
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individuals who differ only with respect to race, it is a reasonable
assumption that discrimination has occurred. The basis of this as-
sumption is that an individual's race has no effect on productivity.
Therefore, the differential treatment by race cannot be motivated
by an acceptable economic reason. 25 It is so implausible that race
can determine a worker's productivity that race is not liable to be a
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ).26 A similar categor-
ical determination of irrelevance to productivity cannot be made
for the characteristics of sex and age. Both sex and age can be as-
sumed to influence productivity in certain instances. As a result,
the equal employment opportunity guidelines on sex and age dis-
crimination include discussions indicating when these characteris-
tics constitute a BFOQ.27 Since age and sex, but not race, can in-
fluence productivity, differential treatment by sex and age may
have an economically rational basis. This produces a difference in
the type of quantitative information which is appropriate to indi-
cate sex and age discrimination from the type of evidence appro-
priate to indicate race discrimination.
The basic distinction in types of evidence involves the analytical
concept of an "intervening variable." An intervening variable is a
variable which is the source of a relationship between two other
variables. As an illustration, consider a relationship between race
and productivity. In this hypothetical example, it is found that
blacks, on average, have lower productivity than whites. It is also
found that the level of education of a worker is positively related
to productivity and that the average level of education is lower for
the group of blacks. If the relationship between race and produc-
tivity is examined separately for each level of education, it is found
that there is no difference in productivity between blacks and
whites.2 The productivity difference between blacks and whites
25 Defining economic discrimination as existing when factors, other than productivity, de-
termine a worker's pay or the probabilities of hiring, promotion or dismissal is common in
the social scientific literature on discrimination. See Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LABOR REL. Rev. 175 (1977).
26 The differential treatment of a minority group as a result of a "business necessity" does
not contradict this. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The concept of a
business necessity to hire a disproportionate number of whites results from an insufficient
number of black applicants having the requisite qualifications for the particular job.
27 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1979), for the
guidelines on sex as a BFOQ. See EEOC, Interpretations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1979), for
discussion of age as a BFOQ relating to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
28 This technique of examining a relationship between two variables while holding con-
stant the value of a third variable is called "statistical control." Discussions of statistical
control can be found in most elementary statistical texts.
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has been explained by the racial difference in educational attain-
ment. Education is the intervening variable in the relationship be-
tween race and productivity.
For a characteristic such as sex or age to be a BFOQ, there must
be a strong relationship between the characteristic and the job
qualification which is the intervening variable in the relationship
between the characteristic and productivity.29 The strength of the
relationship between the characteristic and the intervening varia-
ble can indicate the degree to which the use of the characteristic as
a BFOQ is valid.
In certain instances, sex and age can be considered determinants
of productivity because there is a strong relationship between sex
or age and a qualification for the job.30 In such instances it is nec-
essary to evaluate whether differential treatment in wage, hiring,
promotion or dismissal rates is truly a result of the relationship
between the characteristic and the job qualification, or if it is a
result of discrimination. Quantitative analyses can be useful in
making this distinction.
As an example of this type of analysis, consider a hypothetical
2' As an example, consider the relationships between an actor's age, athletic ability and
the quality of a performance as Tarzan of the Jungle. The quality of the performance is
negatively related to an actor's age. This is the result of the reasonably strong relationship
between age and the intervening variable, athletic ability. As a result of the relationship
between the true occupational qualification of athletic ability and the characteristic of age,
youth is considered a BFOQ to portray Tarzan. See EEOC, Interpretations, 29 C.F.R. §
860.102e (1979).
30 If there is a "perfect" relationship between the characteristic and the job qualification,
then the characteristic itself is a valid BFOQ. For example, the qualification for modeling
women's fashions is a female anatomy, therefore, being female is a BFOQ. At the other
extreme there are job qualifications which have no relationship to sex, e.g., cognitive ability.
Between these extreme examples is a variety of job qualifications which exhibit some rela-
tionship to sex, e.g., physical strength. There is no standard ruling by the courts as to how
strong a relationship between a characteristic and a job qualification there must be before
the characteristic is defined as a BFOQ. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1971), that court held that "sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that
might. . . correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis of the BFOQ exception." Id. at
1225. There the court indicated that only when there is a perfect relationship between the
characteristic (sex) and the job qualification is a BFOQ acceptable. Compare this ruling
with the ruling in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In that
case the Supreme Court accepted the characteristic of age as a BFOQ in lieu of the actual
job qualification of physical fitness. The Court stated:
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more precisely through indi-
vidualized testing after age 50 is not to say that the objective of assuring physi-
cal fitness is not rationally furthered by a maximum age qualification.
Id. at 316. Thus in Murgia, a less than perfect relationship between a characteristic (age)
and a job qualification (physical fitness) was accepted as a basis of making youth (being less
than 50 years old) a BFOQ.
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employer who is hiring for a particular job in the company. An
analysis of the job indicates that there are three qualifications nec-
essary for success in the position. The employee must (1) be at
least a high school graduate, (2) be willing to stay on the job for
the next five years, and (3) be able to lift a 100-pound weight. The
employer decides that each of these qualifications should be
weighted equally in determining expected productivity, and there-
fore the probability of hiring an applicant. The simple decision-
making model used by the employer to determine who should be
hired can be described by the following formula:
HIRE = (GRAD/3) + (STAY/3) + (LIFT/3)
where:
HIRE=the probability that the applicant is hired3"
GRAD= 1, if the applicant has at least a high school education
0, if the applicant has less than a high school
education
STAY=the probability that the applicant is willing to stay on
the job for the next five years. This probability is cal-
culated as [1-(applicant's age/70)]
LIFT=1, if the applicant is able to lift a 100-pound weight
0, if the applicant is not able to lift a 100-pound
weight.
The employer assumes that women, on the average, cannot pass
the weightlifting test. The employer also knows that the
probability of a new employee staying on the job for the next five
years is negatively related to the employee's age, as described by
the formula: STAY= [1-(applicant's age/70)]. Given this
knowledge, the employer wants to determine whether being male
and young are BFOQs.
To resolve this question empirically, the employer analyzes the
data available from his pool of applicants for the job. A description
of the applicant pool is presented in Table II. Each applicant's sex,
age, educational attainment, whether the applicant passed the
weightlifting test, and the probability of staying on the job for five
years is reported in Table II. In addition, the probability of hiring
31 Viewing the decision of hiring a particular applicant as a probability, rather than a
dichotomous choice of hire or not hire, has certain heuristic value. However, the decision-
making model described in the example may be altered to indicate whether or not an appli-
cant is hired without affecting the conclusions derived from the example. Alternatively, the
probability of hiring (HIRE) can simply be thought of as representing the rank ordering of
applicants for the position; with the greater the value of HIRE, the higher the rank of the
applicant.
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the applicant (HIRE), calculated using the decisionmaking model
described above, is reported.
TABLE II
APPLICANT POOL
Job Qualifications
H.S. Passed Probability Hiring
Grad. Lift Test of Staying Probability
Applicant Sex Age (GRAD) (LIFT) 5 Years (HIRE)
(STAY)
1 M 35 YES YES .50 .83
2 M 35 YES NO .50 .50
3 M 40 NO YES .43 .48
4 F 40 YES NO .43 .48
5 F 40 YES YES .43 .81
6 M 45 NO YES .36 .45
7 F 45 NO NO .36 .12
8 F 50 NO NO .29 .10
9 F 55 NO NO .21 .07
10 M 60 NO YES .14 .38
11 F 60 NO NO .14 .05
12 M 65 NO YES .07 .36
13 F 65 YES NO .07 .36
14 F 65 YES YES .07 .69
15 M 70 YES NO .00 .33
16 M 70 YES YES .00 .67
Using these data, the employer calculates the average
probability of hiring a man or a woman. The average probability of
hiring a male applicant is 0.5; the average probability of hiring a
female applicant is 0.33. Since the probability of hiring is based on
the expected productivity in the job, this sex difference in the hir-
ing probability represents an expected sex difference in
productivity.
To determine whether this sex difference is adequate grounds
for making being male a BFOQ, the employer needs to determine
the cause of the sex difference in the hiring probability (expected
productivity). To do this, the employer analyzes the data for rela-
tionships between sex and the three job qualifications (GRAD,
STAY, and LIFT). An appropriate technique for this is correla-
tional analysis.3 2 The correlation between sex and educational at-
32 A correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship between two vari-
ables. The coefficient has a range of values from -1.0 to + 1.0. A value of -1.0 indicates a
perfect negative relationship between two variables; a coefficient equal to + 1.0 indicates a
perfect positive relationship. A correlation coefficient equal to 0.0 indicates the complete
absence of a relationship between two variables. A description of how correlation coefficients
are calculated can be found in most statistics texts.
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tainment (GRAD) and the correlation between sex and the
probability of staying on the job for five years (STAY) are both
0.0, indicating there is no sex difference in either of these qualifica-
tions.3 3 The correlation between sex and passing the weightlifting
test (LIFT) is 0.5, indicating a moderate sex difference in this
qualification."4 The ability to pass the weightlifting test is the in-
tervening variable between sex and the hiring probability which
causes the sex difference in that probability. This can be formally
shown by comparing the correlation coefficient between sex and
the hiring probability (HIRE) with the correlation between sex and
the hiring probability when differences in the ability to pass the
weightlifting test are controlled for. This correlation between sex
and the hiring probability after taking into account the weightlift-
ing qualification is called a partial correlation. 5 The correlation
between sex and the hiring probability is 0.34, indicating that fe-
male applicants are less likely to be hired than male applicants.
After controlling for whether or not an applicant passed the weigh-
tlifting test, the partial correlation between sex and the hiring
probability is 0.0. This indicates that the sex difference in the hir-
ing probability is completely due to the sex difference in the ability
to pass the weightlifting test.
The moderate strength of the relationship between sex and the
job qualification of passing the weightlifting test (the correlation
coefficient of 0:5) would make it difficult for the employer to sub-
stantiate a claim that being male is a BFOQ for the job. Women
should not be categorically excluded from the applicant pool.
A similar analysis is appropriate to determine whether youth is a
BFOQ. Using the same data for the applicant pool, there is a corre-
lation of -0.24 between the applicant's age and the probability of
being hired. This indicates that the older an applicant is, the lower
" The lack of relationships between sex, educational attainment and the probability of
staying on the job for five years was built into the data to simplify the example. Sex differ-
ences in these qualifications and relationships among the qualifications could exist in data
for an actual applicant pool. If such relationships do exist, the basic analytical technique
used in the example is still appropriate, although the calculations become considerably more
complex.
"' Another method of noting the sex difference in the weightlifting job qualification is to
calculate the percentages of male and female applicants who passed the test. Seventy-five
percent of the male applicants passed the test compared to only twenty-five percent of the
female applicants.
36 The value of a partial correlation coefficient has the same interpretation as the value of
a simple correlation coefficient, see note 32 supra, i.e., its range of values is from -1.0 to
+1.0, with 0.0 indicating the lack of a relationship after controlling for the intervening
variable.
1980]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is the probability of being hired. An analysis of the correlations
between age and the three job qualifications reveals correlation co-
efficients of 0.0 between age and educational attainment (GRAD)
and between age and whether the applicant passed the weightlift-
ing test (LIFT). There is a correlation coefficient of -1.0 between
age and the probability that the applicant will stay on the job for
five years.3
In this extreme example, youth completely determines this job
qualification. That the age difference in the probability of being
hired results from age determining this job qualification can be
demonstrated by the partial correlation between age and the hiring
probability controlling for the probability of staying on the job for
five years (STAY). This partial correlation equals 0.0, indicating
that the simple correlation between age and the probability of be-
ing hired (-0.24) is a result of the intervening variable STAY.
Therefore, youth is a BFOQ because it completely determines
one of the job qualifications. Given that staying on the job for five
years is truly a determinant of productivity and the probability of
staying is accurately described by the formula used to calculate
STAY, the employer might properly use youth as a BFOQ. s7
The results from this type of analysis can be used as quantita-
tive evidence of the validity or invalidity of the use of a particular
characteristic as a BFOQ. An additional use of this analysis is to
provide direct quantitative evidence of discrimination in situations
where an applicant's characteristic is related to a qualification of
the job and is the object of an employer's discrimination.
36 As in the example of sex differences, the lack of a relationship between age and both
educational attainment and whether the applicant passed the weightlifting test is an artifi-
cial construction used to simplify the example. The perfect relationship between age and the
probability of staying on the job for five years is also artificially built into the data. Its
purpose is to indicate an extreme example of when a characteristic of an applicant and a job
qualification are perfectly related. It is this type of perfect relationship that was considered
necessary for a characteristic to be a BFOQ in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d
1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
37 With youth as a BFOQ, the employer's decisionmaking model may be described by the
formula:
HIREt = (GRAD/3) + ((70 - AGE)/210) + (LIFT/3)
where AGE is the applicant's age. In this example, HIREr, the probability an applicant is
hired when youth is a BFOQ, equals HIRE as reported in Table II. This is because STAY is
completely determined by the applicant's age. It is worth noting that using youth as a
BFOQ does not categorically exclude an applicant from being hired because of the appli-
cant's age. It merely allows the explicit use of the applicant's age in determining whether
the individual should be hired. Categorical exclusion on the basis of a characteristic which is
a BFOQ is only proper when that characteristic is the sole determinant of expected
productivity.
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To illustrate this use of the analysis, it is necessary to elaborate
upon the example of the employer who is hiring for a job. The em-
ployer's decisionmaking model described above is objectively
nondiscriminating because neither sex nor age is explicitly in-
cluded as a determinant of the probability of hiring. This decision-
making model and the resulting probability that an applicant is
hired are "sex-blind" and "age-blind."
As alternate decisionmaking models consider the following two
formulas used to calculate the probability of hiring an applicant:
HIRE* = (GRAD/3) + (STAY/3) + (LIFT/6) + (SEX/6)
and
HIRE** = (GRAD/4) + (STAY/4) + (LIFT/4) + (SEX/4)
where GRAD, STAY and LIFT are defined as above, and SEX
equals 1 if the applicant is male and 0 if the applicant is female.
The decisionmaking model used to calculate HIRE* weights the
weightlifting qualification only half as much as the model deter-
mining the probability HIRE. This fact alone would decrease the
sex difference in the probability of being hired. However, the ap-
plicant's sex is included as a qualification, weighted to be half as
important as educational attainment and willingness to stay on the
job for five years. The probability HIRE** is determined by a deci-
sionmaking model which places equal weight on the three job qual-
ifications and the applicant's sex. Using these decisionmaking
models, the resulting probability that an applicant is hired is di-
rectly determined by the applicant's sex. Both models discriminate
against female applicants by lowering their probability of being
hired regardless of their qualification for the job (expected
productivity).
Since the decisionmaking model used by an employer is rarely as
explicitly stated as in the formula used to calculate HIRE, HIRE*
or HIRE**, the proof of discrimination is the determination of
which model the employer uses in his hiring decisions. Whether
the employer uses the nondiscriminatory model which produces
the nondiscriminatory hiring probability HIRE or either of the two
discriminatory models can be determined by examining the partial
correlation between sex and the hiring probability after controlling
for the job qualifications. A comparison of the partial correlations
resulting from each of the three decisionmaking models is reported
in Table III.
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TABLE III
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEX AND HIRING PROBABILITY
WITH THREE DECISIONMAKING MODELS
Nondiscriminatory Discriminatory Models
Model
HIRE HIRE* HIRE**
Correlation Between
Sex and Hiring
Probability .34 .55 .74
Partial Correlation
Between Sex and Hiring
Probability Controlling
for Weightlifting
Qualification .00 .38 .63
Percent of Sex
Difference in
Hiring Probability
Due to Employer's
Discrimination 0% 69% 85%
As noted above, with the nondiscriminatory probability HIRE,
the correlation between sex and the hiring probability is totally a
result of the sex difference in the weightlifting job qualification.
Thus when the relationship between sex and the hiring probability
is controlled for differences in this qualification, the partial corre-
lation of sex and the hiring probability is zero.
The lack of a relationship between sex and the hiring
probability, after taking into account the sex difference in the
weightlifting qualification, is not evident when either of the two
discriminatory decisionmaking models is used by the employer.
When the discriminatory hiring probability HIRE* is the appli-
cant's chance of employment, a positive correlation between sex
and the hiring probability remains after controlling for differences
in qualifications. When the decisionmaking model used by the em-
ployer produces the hiring probability HIRE**, the evidence of
discrimination is even more pronounced. The partial correlation
between sex and hiring probability after controlling for sex differ-
ences in job qualifications is 0.63. Eighty-five percent (0.63/0.74) of
the sex difference in the probability of being hired is due to factors
unrelated to job qualifications, i.e., it is a result of discrimination.
The litigant in an employment discrimination case who can
demonstrate that a relationship exists between sex (age, race,
ethnicity) and the hiring (wage, promotion, dismissal) rate, after
controlling for differences in job qualifications, has demonstrated
that the employer is using a discriminatory decisionmaking model.
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In practice, the analysis required for this demonstration can be
considerably more complex than the example presented here. Pro-
ductivity is determined by many qualifications, some of which may
be intervening variables between productivity and characteristics
of sex or age. A further complication is the general lack of mea-
surement of the actual qualifications for a job. Few employers have
more than a vague notion of what determines a worker's productiv-
ity in a particular job. However, as a result of requirements for
employment test validation in the U.G.E.S.P., objective job analy-
ses to determine the qualifications will become more common.3 8
Once these qualifications are defined and applicants are properly
measured to determine whether they possess the qualifications, an
objective determination of discrimination as illustrated in the anal-
ysis may become a common evidential procedure.
CONCLUSION
The three issues discussed in this paper illustrate the potential
use and misuse of quantitative information in employment dis-
crimination cases. It should be evident from these illustrations that
litigants in employment discrimination cases need to understand
the basic logic of statistical inference, the proper measures to indi-
cate discrimination and the analytic procedures which can be used
to demonstrate discrimination.
There is no need for lawyers to become statisticians. The actual
analysis and presentation of quantitative information should be
left to experts. However, proper evaluation of quantitative infor-
mation as probative to employment discrimination is an appropri-
ate task for the legal community.
s See §§ 14B2 & 14D2 of the U.G.E.S.P., 43 Fed. Reg. 38,300, 38,307 (1978).
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